I. lnterval Measures.
By now. the use of an interval measure is regarded highly for probability judgements in reasoning systems. Researchers selecting formalisms for quantifying belief have all recognized the vmucs ot' (partial)l indeterminacy in probability judgement ([Bar8l] , [GLF8l] , [Dil82}, [Low82] . [WeH82] . [Qui83J.
[Wes83], [Gin84), (LuS84), [Str84) . etc.l.
[ntervals allow varying degrees of commitment in probability assertion. At the extreme-;, · P( �) = [0. 1)' is uncommitted. while· P( A)= [.76 . .76)' is consummate. Some ha•e Jrgued that indeterminacy captures "pre-systematic" notions of belief and disbelief [Sha 76), (Lev80a). 2 Since 0 � inf P( A) + inf P(-A) � L the agent can assign Lero belief to a proposition even though he ts not certain that it is talse. Indeterminacy is useful co the subjectivist when eliciting bounds on probabilities (especially from equivocating experts). and to the empiricist for e xpressing the Neyman-Pearson contidence results of %(A, Q):::: 1-8, then %(A, P&Q) = [1 -e -8. 1).
[f probabilities are based on direct inference from the class A, the probability of" Px & Qx" for some x E .l ·.v ould be an interval, desp1tc having started w ith probabilities that were points (see (TSD83j. (Che8.�).
and [Nil841).
Many advocates of in ten al belief mca-;ure.., m \.1. link their argumenrs to Shater·� interprewtion [Sha 76 ] of Dempster's inference system {Dem68).
Shafer's theory is claimed to provide a valuable representation of intervals (via mass functions). and a simple, consistent approach to resolving apparent disputes when combining evidence (via Dempster's rule). These claims are evaluated elsewhere [Kyb85] .
[Lev80a), (Zad79). Shafer's theory is not unique in its abili�y to cope with disagreeing evidence: indeed. a system of belief would be impoverished if it made no provisions tl.>r disagrcemenc (see Levi's remarks [T .ev80a) : also. there are inde terminate systems due to Levi. Smith. Schiele Gnod. and Kyburg). Further. pnpulation sampling.
Dempster's ntle for combining evidence is relatively fntenalism is also natural in decachmem. When presumptuous as a form of conditionalization [Dem68], the decision problem: which act should be chosen [Lcv80b] . [Kyb85] . among available acts. when the agent is not indifferent Putting aside the prospects for Dempster's ntlc. about them all'? In the estimation problem. error is we arc left with these indeterminate probabilities, and avoided by using intervals. In the decision problem.
with an ensuing decision problem. Barnett [Bar81] has not assumed enough. The analy sis should then be founded on an ;ll! gmented set of assumptions.
Conversely. there is no reason to invite error in the analysis if the analysis is already sufficiently informative. So of the many n·s that are decisive, the one that is least prone to error has epistemic priority.
The augmented set of assumptions should be the next least in order of presumptiveness. No more assumptions should be made than are necessary for decision.
Consider the claim that rational c ommitment ceases with the restriction to the maximal set. or that the agent must sometimes suspend judgemem when the set of maxima is not a singleton. V. Examples and Contrasts.
We discuss the following decision problem. 4
Upon finding a berry, the agent has tO decide whether to eat it (a 1 ). or not to eat it (a 2). [fit is eaten. it matters whether or not it was a good berry (G). A Bayesian who considers all the distributions in a closed con vex set can accept different constraints on this set at different levels of acceptance ( cf. [Lev80bj). Typical constraints could be conditions (as in example B). or bounds on marginal probabilities (as in example A). Additional knowledge can lead to additional constraints. which can decrease membership in n and so are more informative (though additional knowledge does not always lead to additional constraints: sometimes it em invalidate a constraint). Some constraints may not be as warranted as mhers. and their use introduces more possibility of error. If the set is indecisive, try the MEU analysis with the next set of constraints.
Savage would have the agent settle on the most �peci fie set (if there is one). and eliminate the excess 197 indeterminacy ofthe preceding sets. !f all the sets are nested (for all i > j , n j :;? n i ). there is no difference between the decisions made by this convex Bayesian and by Savage's Bayesian.
But sets are not nested. The most obvious source of non-nesting is due to conditionalization. 6 Suppose n 1 is based on acceptance so stringent that probabilities are conditional only on A. n 2 takes both A and Has conditions; B is acceptable as a condition at this level (perhaps B is treated by Jeffrey's rule m rJ 1: it doesn't matter here). Then there's no reason for n, to be a subset of n l· l. It's tempting to consider Shafer's discounting parameter to generate successive n's.
The belief with mass 111( G) = . 7 and m(-G) = .3 is to be combined with a belief m( G) = .6: m(-I�) = .4 based on a new. independent source. The latter's impact IS to be discounted by -;omc amount r. Let -H be accepted. [ f r < .23. then P( (i) > .7 5. and a 1 = a*:
otherwise a ! = a* . Note that t()r any value of r here, the resulting probability of G is determinate.
Are some values of r more cautious than others'? If r is large, the informative impact of the second belief is lessened, and it is combined with caution. But a cautious attitude toward the new belief is not If the interpretation of probability is subjective as well as behavioral. the agent or reasoning system can It may be possible to use Shafer·s formalism to spuriously return to the more permissive credal state.
generate then-sequence. but its use would require n. But if this is to be a mle for revision. there seems more argument. no point in making the contraction. If it is not a nde.
then there is still the onerous possibility of spurious change to some other credal state, and worse. the VI. Epistemological Considerations. possibility <)f no change whatsoever after contraction.
A. On Revisions of the Knowledge Base.
Either course violates legitimate counterfactual
A behavioral interpretation of probability suggests the identification of a* as additional evidence about probability judgement. Whatever the means of u*'s identification, there is a set.'!', of admissible probability distributions. according to each of which.
u* is the unique maximum by \liEU means alone.
Behaviorists hold that once u* is identitied. the agent's .::: rcdal state contracts to the more precise n·. the Starr's criterion is a prescription for decision. not for the adopt ton of a narrower credal state. Behaviorists would contract to w.
Whatever the behaviorist arguments, the revelation of credal state through decisions and MEU is unattractive in A.L A system's probability estimates are based on objective analysis of samples, or on the opinions of experts, not on the future decision problems to be faced by the system. B. On Higher-Order Probabilities.
Some Bayes1ans intuit the existence of"higher order" probabilities (e.g., [Goo83J). These would be probability distributions on probability distributions. formalized perhaps, like the indifference "prior" in Starr's criterion.
If one approves of and has access to such measures. then acceptance can be based on the measure. For instance. successive fl's could be generated by eliminating the next-least probable members of the previous fl. This strategy leads to nested fl's; all decisions would be those mandated by the distribution with the greatest higher-order measure. It would not, in general, be the same as taking an expectation over the expected utility intervals, and ranking the resulting real-values: u(a ;>. ) = L{L [P k (E 1 ia;x_)u(<E 1 , a;\>)]Al(P k )} Vk Vi. where M is the higher-order measure.
Perhaps the expectation is appropriate if there is such a measure. However. one should have misgivings about the identification of these measures.
There may be uncertainty about the higher order measure, reflected in some still higher measure. This induces a hierarchy of measures. Presumably the height of the hierarchy is finite. There must be, at �orne high order, either a determinate measure. or else unmeasured indeterminacy. If the former. then one �hould be suspicious about the source of a determinate higher-order-measure: why is the probability of a distribution certain. but the distribution uncertam? !'he higher-level is not inherently more robust 1 note 199 that the order of the sums can be reversed). Just as a small error in a probability can change a decision, so can a small error in a higher-order probability change a decision.
If on the other hand there is unmeasured indeterminacy, the expected-expected utilities will be intervals. This is essentially no different from the interval expected utilities from indeterminate zero order probabilities.
So acceptance can be conceptually related to higher order probabilities, but is not immediately subsumed or improved by them.
VII. Conclusion.
A.I. systems that use interval judgements must sometimes solve partial ignorance decision problems.
There are now two approaches. Maximizing expected utility can be followed by maximin, or some other secondary criterion. Alternatively. additional assumptions can be made that change probabilities, temporarily, so that maximizing expected utility is sufficient. This paper has discussed how to implement the latter approach. Assumptions are accepted in an order that tries to avoid error. and they arc accepted only temporarily, for the purposes of decision.
There is still the problem of choosing an acceptance rule. which iteratively generates the next best assumption. This choice requires considerably more epistemological retlection. 2 Some have charged that the specification of an interval requires two numbers rather than one: hence. it requires more information. That's silly. Given that some quantity pis in fa ct 0.67, it fo llows that pi s in the interval (0.34, 0.97]. Furthermore, in a very natural canonical fo rm. namely, the number of hyper planar constraints required in the space of all probability distributions: the information (number of constraints) in interval reports of a particular probability is less than the information in point reports. Information measures are dependent on canonical fo rm. hence can be misleading.
Intervals are chosen because they offer robust behavior. If practice shows that they are not robust �nough, that endpoints matter critically, then fu ture investigators can fe el free to use a fo rmalism with mdetermmate upper and lower bounds, or w1th fuzzy sets. Surely one would not revert to point probabilities because they contain "less information." 3 Here, we've taken informativeness w.r.t. decision to be singulanty of fi or singularity of the maximal set. Other interpretations of"informative" are possible (such as any restnction of the max imal set to decisions which cannot differ in outcome more than € ). These lead to different decision theories.
Also note that in [Lou85], the amount of tolerable error ts addresed (see the discussion of D meaningful corpora).
4 We call this the problem of Jerry 's Berries. } is over determinins. If constraints are accepted (rather than knowledge that generates constramt), and acceptance IS purely probabilistic. then this kind of situation requires acceptance levels at or below .5.
With not purely probabilistic acceptance. this situation is more natural.
Note that non-nested fi 's would seem irrational via a Dutch Book argument. but the agent still posts consistent odds whenever he considers two or more lotteries simultaneously. It's only when he post s odds independently and they are subsequently collected that leads to inconsistency. Consult the Ellsberg paradox for intuitions here.
